Difference Between Cold War And Terrorism Essays

Last week U.S. President Barack Obama gave a wide-ranging speech on counterterrorism where he pledged to reduce the intensity of America’s operations against al-Qaeda and its affiliates. If he is able to successfully implement his agenda, it would mark another turning point in the U.S. war on terrorism that closely mirrors the trajectory of U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War.

The initial U.S. posture during the Cold War was to deny that one existed at all. Indeed, President Harry Truman took office determined to follow his predecessor’s post-war vision of the U.S. and Soviet Union cooperating closely as part of the four global policemen. Truman would continue to pursue this policy even as the Soviet Union’s ambitions became readily apparent. Thus, the inexperienced president would order the fastest demobilization in U.S. history even as Moscow devoured Eastern and parts of Central Europe, and clearly set its sights on other areas of the globe.

It would take a number of dramatic events coinciding before the U.S. was completely woken from its slumber. Specifically, the first signs of containment began emerging in 1947 after Stalin’s designs on Turkey became difficult to deny in the second half of 1947. Truman’s overextension quickly followed beginning in 1949 when Mao’s forces emerged victorious in the Chinese Civil War and the Soviet Union tested its first atomic weapon, which led the Truman administration to begin drafting NSC-68, drastically expanding the scope of containment.

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This trend continued when Kim Il-Sung invaded South Korea the following year. Despite having stated unambiguously that South Korea was outside the U.S. “defensive perimeter,” U.S. forces would intervene not just to save South Korea from communism but later also unify the entire Korean Peninsula. Meanwhile, in Congress Joseph McCarthy began his infamous witch hunt of Soviet sympathizers in the U.S. government and society.

Just how dramatic of a swing this was in such a short period of time was well illustrated by George Kennan. In the initial years of Truman’s tenure, he had been more hawkish than most senior administration officials in advocating for a containment strategy against the Soviet Union. Yet, only a couple of years later in 1950 Kennan quit the State Department in opposition to the hardline stance the Truman administration adopted following the events of 1949-1950.  

Kennan’s concern over American overstretch were well-founded as became evident after the UN-led forces in Korea crossed the 38th Parallel and continued heading North, prompting an intervention from the Chinese. The American people soon lost their appetite for large military interventions after the UN forces retreated back across the 38th Parallel and the war became bogged down. 

Thus, Dwight Eisenhower was elected president in 1952 running on a platform to end the Korean conflict, which he would do over the next couple of years. At the same time, to battle the Soviet threat he initially relied on America’s technological advantage in nuclear weapons, aggressive covert action run by the Central Intelligence Agency, and the strengthening of allied forces particularly through rearming West Germany and integrating it into NATO. Throughout his eight years in office, Eisenhower only once deployed American forces on the ground in a conflict zone (Lebanon) and quickly withdrew them. He also refused to intervene in other contingencies like Egypt and Indochina despite allies’ pleas.

Later in his presidency, however, Eisenhower became more wary about using covert action so frequently and aggressively, and recognized the country couldn’t rely on a massive retaliation strategy indefinitely, given its moral implications and the Soviet’s likely closure of the technology gap in nuclear arms and missiles in about a decade’s time. He also sought negotiations with the Soviet Union and continued to resist heavy domestic pressure from individuals like Senator John F. Kennedy to re-militarize America’s Cold War strategy. Indeed, his last speech as president was dedicated to the dangers of doing just that.

America’s response to al-Qaeda’s emergence has unintentionally followed an eerily similar trajectory. Osama bin Laden’s declaration of war against the United States in 1996 barely registered inside the U.S. government. Its 1998 attacks on U.S. embassies in Africa only piqued President Clinton’s attention briefly, with real concern only developing among him and his senior aides after the attack on the USS Cole in 2000. Indeed, with the exception of the missile strikes in the immediate aftermath of the 1998 attacks, Clinton still refused to authorize operations to eliminate bin Laden if there was almost any risk of civilian casualties. Late in Clinton’s second term his administration also launched a new public relations campaign depicting Saddam Hussein as the greatest threat to U.S. and global security.

Any interest the Clinton administration’s senior policymakers had developed about al-Qaeda in the final days of their tenure did not carry over to the George W. Bush administration, much to the chagrin of the counterterrorism holdovers at the National Security Council.

The 9/11 attacks rightly reversed this neglect of al-Qaeda. As early as the night of the attacks, however, Washington began to drastically overreach to the threat, when George W. Bush declared a war against anyone who commits terrorism or harbors those that do instead of against the adversary who had just attacked the U.S. homeland. Starting from this definition of the problem his administration launched two massive wars and vastly expanded the size and authority of the national security organizations inside the U.S. government.

Much like Korea, however, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq quickly soured the American people on war. Thus, by the time Obama succeeded Bush in 2009, a new more sustainable approach to counterterrorism was clearly needed. Even as he launched a surge of troops in Afghanistan (with a defined timeline for withdrawing them) Obama, like Eisenhower, quickly began prosecuting the war against al-Qaeda largely by relying heavily on America’s technological advantages and more aggressive covert operations run largely by the CIA. Alongside these efforts, the White House has redoubled efforts to better train security forces across the globe, while remaining inherently hesitant to commit U.S. forces to new military conflicts.

Despite the undeniably success of this strategy so far, the Obama administration is worried that it will eventually face blowback from its actions and therefore hopes to rein itself in. This is prudent strategy but it remains to be seen whether this attempt will succeed or, like the U.S. during the 1960s, Washington will unnecessarily re-escalate its campaign again.

The War on Terror has changed the world of international politics greatly. Old traditions and customs such as the respect for state sovereignty and the formal equality of states have been shaken. Humanitarian intervention and concerns for human security have been forced into the background, and the human rights and liberty of citizens of all nations are being threatened by the War on Terror.

This essay will evaluate the extent to which the War on Terror, started by the US in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001, is changing contemporary politics, and how. It will briefly look at the situation before the War on Terror began, and will then examine the ways in which the War on Terror has influenced the freedoms of citizens and how liberty has been affected by the desire for security and protection. The changes to the international community that have occurred and the damage that has been done to the stability of the system will be examined. The changes in priorities and objectives on an international level will be analysed with the change from intervention for humanitarianism to intervention for security. The essay will then move on to the probable future consequences of the war and will then take a look at how the War on Terror may continue to shape politics.

At the end of the Cold War, the United States of America was left as the single most powerful nation in the world. The victory of capitalism over communism had resulted in a dramatic shift from realism as the dominant theory in international relations, to liberalism. Realism had failed to anticipate the end of the Cold War, and had instead predicted a continual balance of power between the USSR and the USA. Liberal academics such as Francis Fukuyama heralded an ‘end of history’[1], a new world in which liberal democracy, having been proved to be the most effective system of government, will spread across the globe and will result in a peaceful, united world. Liberals believe that democracy has a unique trait in that it is an inherently peaceful system, as there is yet to be a war between liberal democratic nations. They argue that this is because liberal democracies form links between each other, initially through trade alliances and economic interdependence. They predicted that states themselves will become more interdependent and unified because democracies are ruled by the individual citizens within them, who are much more likely to want to benefit from trading with another nation rather than declaring war against them.[2] And in the post-Cold War world, this seemed to be occurring.

Liberals in the post-Cold War period pointed to international organisations such as the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the World Trade Organisation, Interpol, and of course the United Nations, as well as many other organisations, as symbols of the ability of states to cooperate and work together for mutual gain. They envisaged an international system of collaboration and union.

Ever since the 1600s the international community has adhered to the principles of Westphalian Sovereignty. In this view sovereignty is the right of all governments to rule their nations as they see fit, free of external challenge (although they were never granted the right to abuse their citizens).[3] The Westphalian tradition saw that international order and stability were of great importance, but to achieve this states had to respect one another’s right to govern. In the 20th century however, Westphalian sovereignty began to be challenged by the growing concern that states are not always able or willing to protect their citizens’ human rights. Indeed, in the 20th century alone 262 million people were killed by their own governments: six times more than the number of people killed in battle with foreign governments[4].

After the Cold War, Humanitarianism became a very powerful force, which resulted in numerous interventions. The humanitarian failures in Rwanda and the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia prompted international organisations and politicians to re-evaluate the meaning of sovereignty and the responsibility for states to intervene in the governing of other nations when human rights and human security is threatened.[5] The humanitarian movement of the 1990s started to crack the norms of non-intervention and traditional views of sovereignty, which the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent War on Terror have shattered.

The events on September 11th 2001 had a great impact on nations all over the globe. It shook the core assumptions that had shaped international politics, and demonstrated that in the modern world threats to security are present on all levels, not only from states, but from individuals from anywhere in the world. 9/11 made it obvious how interconnected the world had become, and how no nation can cut itself off from the rest of the world. It showed how space and territory were no longer boundaries which protected states, as dangers can come from anywhere. It can also be seen that 9/11 showed that the military strength, size of a nation’s high tech arsenal, and geostrategic power provides little protection from the new globalised terrorists, who were able to cause such chaos using only parcel knives to seize control of an aeroplane.[6][7]

In America the terrorist attacks sparked a great amount of shock, fear, sadness, and also hatred. In the eyes of the West, the world had become divided into good and evil, and a vast series of new threats and dangers came into focus. Although terrorism was nothing new at the time, there had never been a terrorist attack which had received such media attention.[8] The US reacted to the attacks with the declaration of a ‘war on terror’ to eliminate the terrorist networks which had grown around the world. It was widely recognised that terrorist networks tended to thrive in failed, rogue or unstable states, and so these states became the focus of intervention.[9]

The interventions in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 were not humanitarian however. Certainly, the US did intend to remove two ruthless regimes that had butchered and oppressed their people. The invasion of Afghanistan was also argued by Donald Rumsfeld as being in line with previous interventions in Kosovo, Bosnia, Somalia, Northern Iraq and Kuwait ‘for the purpose of denying hostile regimes the opportunity to oppress their own people and other people.’[10]

The key difference between the invasions in the War on Terror and previous humanitarian interventions are, as Paul Heinbecker the Canadian Ambassador to the UN described, the interventions in Kosovo and East Timor were based on concern for the vulnerable ‘other, whereas Afghanistan and Iraq were fought for the protection of the ‘self’.[11] Indeed, before the invasion of Iraq the crisis was described with little focus on the suffering of civilians within Iraq, but on the threat that the nation posed to other nations. It was only after support for the war diminished and the weakness of the links between Al Qaida and Saddam Hussein was exposed that humanitarian arguments were used for justification. [12] However, it can be argued that the threat of terrorism is actually rather minor when compared to other threats to human security around the world. Poverty and underdevelopment and the problems they cause, as well as natural disasters, wars, crime, and even car accidents are arguably greater threats to survival. Indeed, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 killed nearly three thousand people in one day, whereas at least as many children die every day of avoidable intestinal diseases such as dysentery and diarrhoea caused mainly by impure water, and in late 2006 there were a similar number of people dying every month in the insurgency and sectarian violence in Iraq.[13] Interventions are now no longer about saving the lives of citizens of other nations, and are now all about security.

The War on Terror has caused severe damage to the concept of state sovereignty and has set a very dangerous precedent for arguments of legitimate intervention. This damage to sovereignty could well lead to the lowering of legal, psychological, and political barriers to the use of force against other nations for all manner of purposes. This might have initiated a ‘frame shattering, norm changing process’ which will reduce them further.[14] An example of this is in Russia’s decision to invade Georgia, to which Vladimir Putin compared the US invasion of Iraq:

“They [the Americans] of course had to hang Saddam Hussein for destroying several Shia villages. But the current Georgian rulers who in one hour simply wiped 10 Ossetian villages from the face of the earth, the Georgian rulers which used tanks to run over children and the elderly, which threw civilians into cellars and burnt them – they [Georgian leaders] are players that have to be protected.”[15]

The perceived threat of terrorism has provided impetus for pre-emptive intervention against states that show the symptoms of one which may become a breeding ground for terrorists; this has meant that the target of the War on Terror is not limited to terrorist networks, but states which are perceived as having the conditions which may spread terrorism, and it has enabled the US to invade before the target state has, or imminently will, attack.[16] This presents a very serious challenge to the principles of sovereignty, as it gives states the justification to change, interfere and intervene in how a state is governed. This has the potential of eroding the normative framework of the use of force enshrined in the UN Charter and shakes international law and the core principles of the UN, both in its defiance of the traditional views toward sovereignty and the challenging of the boundaries of the legitimate use of force.[17] Speaking in 1956 US Secretary of State John Foster argued that ‘The violent armed attack by three members of the United nations upon a fourth cannot be treated as anything but a grave error inconsistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter’[18] however this is a growing occurrence in the War on Terror.

The War on Terror has also treated states unequally, which is undermining the formal equality of states protected in the UN Charter. The Bush doctrine has granted some states (such as France, Israel and India the right to provide for their defence as they see fit, but not others (such as Iran etc).[19] The war has also strained relationships between the US and the other members of the coalition that invaded Iraq, and many other members of the UN including allies such as France and Germany. This strain, combined with the damages to the principles of the United Nations could cause a fracturing of the international community.

The effects of the War on Terror are not limited to the realm of states however. The internal politics of the states fighting the war have also changed. Before 9/11 the surveillance and biometric industry was steadily growing, but growth was restricted by concerns for liberty and privacy. However, since the start of the War on Terror, security and surveillance technology has seen a massive surge in usage. Zureik showed that within weeks of the attack on the World Trade Centre, the US Congress introduced seventeen new bills with measures to increase border security and impose stricter regulations on migration and travel.[20] Many countries have seen similar increases in surveillance of their own citizens, particularly the UK, which may now have more CCTV cameras per capita than anywhere else, and over 4.8 million cameras in operation.[21]

The War on Terror has encouraged states to police their borders far more cautiously with a myriad of security checks needed in travelling between nations and far stricter regulations on who is allowed to travel. The movements of people anywhere is now very closely watched, and the government now has the power to locate and track the behaviour of virtually anyone through the use of technologies such as CCTV, border control, GPS, bank transactions, and even mobile phones can be used by the state to locate and trace members of the public. On top of this, the content of phone calls and e-mails can be monitored and used by intelligence agencies. The War on Terror has sparked numerous policies to be undertaken and legislations enforced which would have never previously been even considered due to the threat that they pose to human rights. One example is the US PATRIOT Act, which enables security services to search a suspect’s home or place of work, record conversations, and monitor phone lines, emails and financial records without the knowledge or permission of the individual concerned or a court order. Another is the torture and rendition of people in Guantanamo Prison and other such places as well as the imprisonment of well over 100,000 people without trial.[22] There have been similar actions taken in the UK also, such as new legislation giving security forces much greater powers to detain and interrogate terrorism suspects.[23] There have even been allegations made recently that the UK has had knowledge of, and assisted the torture of British citizens and terrorism suspects in overseas prisons.[24]

This authoritarian approach to security is a worrying trend which has compromised liberty and human rights around the world, especially those of foreign nationals and refugees, who are now not only discriminated against and blamed for scrounging welfare and stealing jobs, but are also accused of playing a role in the globalised terrorist network. The War on Terror has lead to migrants being subjected to racism and distrust, as well as deprivation of their human rights. They can now be detained on charges which they cannot defend against as they are not always told what they are accused of having done[25]. These changes show a broad shift of Western societies to becoming ‘control states’, nations in which individuals are tightly regulated and controlled by the state and other institutions in all areas of life. The movement and behaviour of citizens has become restricted and people are constantly surveilled.[26]

It can be argued that the War on Terror may not actually have a weakening effect on the state as an entity despite the damage that it has done to sovereignty in many cases. Indeed, the War on Terror may have actually made the state stronger. The concept of pharmacotic war is the idea that war can have a ‘healing’ effect on a nation that can remove internal disorder, restore authority and legitimacy of government, and create union and consensus among a nation’s people. Larry George argues that this is the case in the War on Terror. But pharmacotic war is far from a good thing, it requires the identification of an enemy, usually a scapegoat on whom the troubles of the state can be pinned. This practice was used in Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, apartheid Africa, the 1970s military dictatorships of Chile and Argentina, and now in the nations fighting the War on Terror.[27]

The War on Terror mirrors the model of previous pharmacotic wars, with a political crisis facing the community in which a violent, ‘symbolically resonant violation’ occurs. Examples of this are the Boston massacre, Fort Sumter, Lusitania, Pearl Harbour, and Tonkin Gulf scenarios in which innocent lives are lost and others are endangered. This leads to the identification and demonization of an external enemy leading to a punitive military response against the perceived threat[28]. The effect of this on contemporary politics is the depoliticisation of issues and actions which are viewed as being necessary for the safety and survival of the state. The War on Terror has granted the Bush Administration the support of the US citizens and much of the international community to police the oil fields and pipelines in Central Asia, provide security for a pipeline from the Caspian Sea to the Arabian Sea, to become militarily involved in the civil war in Georgia and Uzbekistan, to support Moscow’s repression of the Chechen rebellion and Israel’s actions in the West Bank, to support the Philippine government’s conflict with Islamist rebels, to support the undemocratic Saudi royal family, it has transformed the counternarcotics program in Colombia into an element of the War on Terror, to adopt an aggressive foreign policy toward North Korea and Iran, and, of course, the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.[29]

The War on Terror has clearly had a considerable effect on international and domestic politics. Whether or not the changes thus far experienced will gather momentum and lead to the complete breakdown of international community and law and order, however, remains to be seen. Although the US has succeeded in going against the will of the UN (and breaching international law) it is questionable whether it will be able to continue to do so for much longer. With the US’ status as the global hegemon in the international system being gradually lost due to its failures in dealing with terrorism, it may have to become more careful with its power and try to appease the rest of the United Nations. Indeed, the Obama administration is much less eager to follow the precedence set by the Bush doctrine, and even the use of the term ‘war on terror’ is falling into disuse.

However, the precedence that the War on Terror has set for the rest of the world may continue to change international politics. The excuse of counter-terrorism in establishing authoritarian policies and in intervening other nations is a popular, and evidently effective one, and the damage to state sovereignty, international law and may see breakdown of the United Nations and the international community. So the War on Terror may have begun to wind to a close, but the effects of it may continue to change the world dramatically.

Bibliography

Fukuyama, Francis ‘The End of History’, National Interest, 16, 1989

LN George ‘The Pharmacotic War on Terrorism: Cure or Poison for the US Body Politic?‘
Theory, Culture & Society, 19: 161, Sage Publications, Nottingham, 2002

Z Bauman ‘Reconnaissance Wars of the Planetary Frontierland‘ ‘Theory, Culture & Society’, 2002

Deleuze, Gilles ‘Postscript on the Societies of Control‘ ‘October’, Vol, 59, The MIT Press, 1992

Binyam blames UK for mistreatment’, BBC News, Friday 13th March 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7940958.stm, accessed on 13/03/09

Lutz, Brenda & Lutz, James ‘Terrorism’ in Collins, Alan ‘Contemporary Security Studies’, Oxford University press, Oxford, 2007

Roger, Paul ‘Terrorism’ in Williams, Paul D. ‘Security Studies: An Introduction’, Routledge, London, 2008

Lewis, Paul ‘Every step you take: UK underground centre that is spy capital of the world’ ‘The Guardian’, Monday 2nd March 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/mar/02/westminster-cctv-system-privacy, accessed on 13/03/09

Introna, Lucas & Wood, David ‘Picturing algorithmic surveillance: The politics of facial recognition systems‘, McCahil & Wood ‘CCTV Special’, ‘Surveillance & Society’ 2(2/3),

Farer, Tom J. ‘Humanitarian Intervention Before and After 9/11: Legality and legitimacy’ in Holzgrefe, J.L & Keohane, Robert O. ‘Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas’ Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003

Welsh, Jennifer M. ‘Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations’, Oxford University press, Oxford, 2004,

BBC News ‘Georgia conflict: key Statements’ news.bbc.co.uk, 19 August 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7556857.stm, accessed on 11/03/09

David Chandler ‘From Kosovo to Kabul and Beyond: Human Rights and International Intervention’ Pluto press, London, 2006,

Z Bauman ‘Reconnaissance Wars of the Planetary Frontierland‘ ‘Theory, Culture & Society’, 2002

Bellamy, Alex J ‘The Responsibility to Protect’ in Williams, Paul D ‘Security Studies: An Introduction’ Routledge, London, 2008

Panke, Diana & Risse, Thomas ‘Liberalism’ in dunne, kurki & Smith ‘International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity’, Oxford University press, Oxford, 2007


[1] Fukuyama, Francis ‘The End of History’, National Interest, 16, 1989

[2] Panke, Diana & Risse, Thomas ‘Liberalism’ in dunne, kurki & Smith ‘International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity’, Oxford University press, Oxford, 2007, p97-98

[3] Farer, Tom J. ‘Humanitarian Intervention Before and After 9/11: Legality and legitimacy’ in Holzgrefe, J.L & Keohane, Robert O. ‘Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas’ Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p56

[4] Bellamy, Alex J ‘The Responsibility to Protect’ in Williams, Paul D ‘Security Studies: An Introduction’ Routledge, London, 2008, p423

[5] Bellamy, Alex J ‘The Responsibility to Protect’ in Williams, Paul D ‘Security Studies: An Introduction’ Routledge, London, 2008

[6] Z Bauman ‘Reconnaissance Wars of the Planetary Frontierland‘ ‘Theory, Culture & Society’, 2002, p3-4

[7] Roger, Paul ‘Terrorism’ in Williams, Paul D. ‘Security Studies: An Introduction’, Routledge, London, p172

[8] Roger, Paul ‘Terrorism’ in Williams, Paul D. ‘Security Studies: An Introduction’, Routledge, London, p173

[9] Welsh, Jennifer M. ‘Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations’, Oxford University press, Oxford, 2004, p182

[10] Rumsfeld, Donald, quoted in David Chandler ‘From Kosovo to Kabul and Beyond: Human Rights and International Intervention’ Pluto press, London, 2006, p1

[11] Welsh, Jennifer M. ‘Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations’, Oxford University press, Oxford, 2004, p181

[12] Welsh, Jennifer M. ‘Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations’, Oxford University press, Oxford, 2004, p183

[13] Roger, Paul ‘Terrorism’ in Williams, Paul D. ‘Security Studies: An Introduction’, Routledge, London, p172

[14] Farer, Tom J. ‘Humanitarian Intervention Before and After 9/11: Legality and legitimacy’ in Holzgrefe, J.L & Keohane, Robert O. ‘Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas’ Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p82

[15] Putin, Vladimir, 11th August 2008 quoted in BBC News ‘Georgia conflict: key Statements’ news.bbc.co.uk, 19 August 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7556857.stm, accessed on 11/03/09

[16] Farer, Tom J. ‘Humanitarian Intervention Before and After 9/11: Legality and legitimacy’ in Holzgrefe, J.L & Keohane, Robert O. ‘Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas’ Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p81

[17] Welsh, Jennifer M. ‘Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations’, Oxford University press, Oxford, 2004, p182

[18] US secretary of State John Foster Dulles 1956 UNGA ‘Records’, Ist Emergency Special session, 562nd meeting, 23, quoted in Farer, Tom J. ‘Humanitarian Intervention Before and After 9/11: Legality and legitimacy’ in Holzgrefe, J.L & Keohane, Robert O. ‘Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas’ Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p81

[19] Farer, Tom J. ‘Humanitarian Intervention Before and After 9/11: Legality and legitimacy’ in Holzgrefe, J.L & Keohane, Robert O. ‘Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas’ Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p82

[20] Introna, Lucas & Wood, David ‘Picturing algorithmic surveillance: The politics of facial recognition systems‘, McCahil & Wood ‘CCTV Special’, ‘Surveillance & Society’ 2(2/3), p6

[21] Lewis, Paul ‘Every step you take: UK underground centre that is spy capital of the world’ ‘The Guardian’, Monday 2nd March 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/mar/02/westminster-cctv-system-privacy, accessed on 13/03/09

[22] Roger, Paul ‘Terrorism’ in Williams, Paul D. ‘Security Studies: An Introduction’, Routledge, London, p182

[23] Lutz, Brenda & Lutz, James ‘Terrorism’ in Collins, Alan ‘Contemporary Security Studies’, Oxford University press, Oxford, 2007

[24] ‘Binyam blames UK for mistreatment’, BBC News, Friday 13th March 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7940958.stm, accessed on 13/03/09

[25] Z Bauman ‘Reconnaissance Wars of the Planetary Frontierland‘ ‘Theory, Culture & Society’, 2002, p5-6

[26] Deleuze, Gilles ‘Postscript on the Societies of Control‘ ‘October’, Vol, 59, The MIT Press, 1992

[27] LN George ‘The Pharmacotic War on Terrorism: Cure or Poison for the US Body Politic?‘
Theory, Culture & Society, 19: 161, Sage Publications, Nottingham, 2002, p1-10

[28] LN George ‘The Pharmacotic War on Terrorism: Cure or Poison for the US Body Politic?‘
Theory, Culture & Society, 19: 161, Sage Publications, Nottingham, 2002, p1

[29] LN George ‘The Pharmacotic War on Terrorism: Cure or Poison for the US Body Politic?‘
Theory, Culture & Society, 19: 161, Sage Publications, Nottingham, 2002, p11-12

Written by: David Sykes
Written at: Lancaster University
Written for: Mark Bailey
Date written: 2009

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